La situation Grecque et le blocage des négociations posent beaucoup de problèmes différents. On peut faire comme les politiciens, c’est à dire les escamoter et se borner à dire que les contrats doivent être respectés. On peut faire comme Hollande, parler pour ne rien dire et afficher un accord scandaleux avec Merkel. On peut, on peut ; on peut ..

Il est possible de se comporter comme de vrais guides des opinions publiques et de les éclairer. Ce que personne ne tente de faire, tant on préfère les sondages idiots aux enquêtes d’opinion éclairées.

Parmi les points qui méritent un éclairage nous en voyons un qui est fondamental. Nous l’avons déjà traité, c’est celui de l’équilibre entre les responsabilités.

Nous ne cessons de faire valoir que les créanciers ont des responsabilités au moins aussi importantes dans la déconfiture Grecque que les débiteurs, et surtout les banquiers ; Goldman Sachs en tête et Draghi en premier, pour avoir non seulement prêté inconsidérément mais aussi dissimulé le montant des endettements. Or ces même banquiers ont réussi à revendre toutes leurs créances pourries aux Institutions Européennes , ils sont maintenant dégagés sur votre dos, sur vous, les citoyens, sur vous les contribuables. Quant à Draghi qui a supervisé , chez Goldman, les tricheries Grecques, au lieu d’être au ban de la finance, il se pavane à la tête de la BCE au milieu des autres copains et coquins.

Il y à un autre aspect que nous n’avons pas abordé , mais qui mérite de l’être. Les plans successifs imposés à la Grèce se sont révélés des échecs cuisants. Les Institutions , la Troika se sont trompées. Elles ont aggravé la situation du pays au lieu de la curer. Ce sont les créanciers qui ont imposé des plans idiots à la Grèce et on a tendance à le passer sous silence. Les pseudo savants ont soigné l’affaiblissement du malade par des saignées successives qui ont mis ses forces vitales au ralenti.

Et si les Grecs sont déclarés responsables des dettes de leur gouvernement, alors qu’ils n’ont rien signé, alors, pourquoi les contribuables des pays créanciers ne seraient ils pas responsables des imbécillités de leurs leaders ? Serions nous dans des systèmes de responsabilité démocratiques à géométrie variable ?

Le texte ci dessous produit par le Peterson Institute pose le problème de la responsabilité des prêteurs qui imposent un Plan inadapté. Il analyse la situation dans laquelle le docteur prescrit des remèdes non seulement inopérants, mais des remèdes qui aggravent le mal.

Pour prévenir l’asymétrie qui règne actuellement, le PIIE suggère que l’on fasse participer les créanciers qui imposent les plans de sauvetage aux résultats de de ces plans. L’idée est de les pafaire partager les risques des politiques qu’ils imposent : « One way to mitigate future democracy mismatches would be to link debt repayment at the outset to the achievement of agreed policy objectives, so that creditors designing the policies would share some of the risk with the debtor. » ; les créanciers doivent avoir « some skin in the game ».

Voici le texte du Peterson.

« This mismatch between the political accountability of sovereign borrowers and lenders—a democracy mismatch—can lead to overlending based on flawed policies and improbable assumptions, which might be avoided if creditors have a more direct stake in the consequences of their prescriptions for the borrowing population from the start. In future debt arrangements, policy lenders and government borrowers alike would benefit from tying a small portion of debt repayment to economic and social outcomes. Contingent debt would improve accountability and help align incentives for all involved.

Greece is only the latest and starkest example of the democracy mismatch in public debt crises, which affects political units from sovereign states to US [pdf] municipalities. Members of the crisis-stricken polity cede control to some mix of creditors, experts, and more-or-less neutral arbiters. These outsiders become the “adults in the room,” charged with making unpopular decisions to restore solvency. Democracy gives way to “ownership,” a squishy term for popular buy-in of outside policies.

Putting outsiders in charge might make sense in corporate bankruptcy. Shareholders and managers lose their right to govern when they run up unpayable debts. They yield to judges and creditors, especially those who lend in bankruptcy when no one else will. In exchange, new lenders get a senior claim and the right to tell the debtor how to run its business.

Giving crisis lenders repayment priority and a hand in policy design also makes sense for international organizations such as the IMF, which has fought debt crises since the 1980s, and for the European institutions new to this line of work. If they are to advance taxpayer funds to revive a grossly mismanaged economy, shouldn’t they call the shots?
Not necessarily.

First, even an inept government has a far greater claim to policy sovereignty than corporate managers. Moreover, the sidelined government may not be the same as the one that drove the economy into the debt ditch. In sovereign debt, today’s mistakes constrain future governments, future taxpayers, and future voters, who cannot file for bankruptcy.

Second, official creditors in sovereign debt crises have unique advantages over lenders in bankruptcy. Their long repayment horizons and senior claims on debtors that cannot be liquidated let them take bigger risks, while assuring taxpayers that their money is safe. Yet even the most expert and well-intentioned outsiders will make mistakes. These mistakes may compound when the various “adults” try to coordinate priorities and prescriptions, as the IMF and euro area institutions have done in Greece. Official creditors’ reputations might suffer if the debtor is slow to recover, but only a rare political rupture triggers outright default and large-scale damage beyond its borders. It would be nuts to imply that Europe was unaffected by what happened in Greece; nevertheless, perversely, the Greek people still pay the heaviest price both for the mistakes of their own elected leaders and for those of the creditors, accountable to voters elsewhere.

Third and related, lenders’ mandates can be in tension with the debtor’s needs. Creditor governments have national interests. The IMF is bound by its charter to safeguard its resources. All this is as it should be, but it creates perverse incentives. A sovereign debt crisis is, by definition, a political crisis and a systemic financial crisis inside the borrowing country. For the rest of the world, the crisis hurts when it spreads. As a result, creditors will underemphasize the political cost of their policy demands for the debtor, and overemphasize the risk of contagion. Such bias can lead them to fuel a gamble for resurrection by an already overindebted government, lending in exchange for unbelievable promises for the sake of other countries and financial institutions.

One way to mitigate future democracy mismatches would be to link debt repayment at the outset to the achievement of agreed policy objectives, so that creditors designing the policies would share some of the risk with the debtor. The debtor would get a modicum of financial relief if its economy fails to recover, though any such relief would be too small to justify sabotaging its own recovery. The amount of outcome-contingent debt can be small because the principal goal of risk-sharing is political accountability for the creditors. If they can no longer promise unconditional repayment to their own constituents, the adults in the room have “skin in the game.”

The reverse is the norm in sovereign debt: Multilateral lenders do not restructure, while more and more bilateral lenders, from Russia in Ukraine to euro area members in Greece, have balked at debt relief. If a small fraction of their investment were tied to policy success, creditor officials would have to defend their policy advice more vigorously up front to their own stakeholders and might be less inclined to take policy risks.

Requiring creditors to share in the risk of their prescriptions might mean less crisis lending or less ambitious policy conditions. Either would be welcome. A government that cannot agree on credible policy reform with its creditors should not borrow more; it should restructure sooner. At the other extreme, lighter conditions would reflect creditors’ appreciation for the debtor’s domestic political challenge, so that there is no need for an eleventh-hour referendum. »

Anna Gelpern