Ci dessous un bon article de Hilsenrath dans le WSJ.

Il pose la question de la morale en matière de règlement des problèmes de dettes internationales et montre que la morale du plus fort n’est pas forcément la meilleure.

Après le rappel de la logique des crises antérieures, Hilsenrath fait valoir que le point de vue des créanciers qui imposent des règles pour venir en aide, ne sont pas désintéréssées et que chacun en fait défend le point de vue qui lui est favorable. Le succès de la Malaisie qui a refusé de céder devant le FMI est un exemple célèbre.

Selon Hilsenrath, la Grèce est fondée à faire valoir, comme nous le faisons, que la morale n’est pas du coté des prêteurs quand ils veulent que les créanciers imprudents fassent leur plein; aussi bien les emprunteurs que les banques prêteuses ont commis des fautes .

L’issue de l’affrontement dépendra du rapport de forces entre d’un côté la Grèce qui va être à court de liquidités et de l’autre l’UE qui va voir vaciller son Union Monétaire.

« Debt crises have a way of playing out like morality tales for the people involved and many of those observing.

One of the more searing memories of the 1997-1998 financial crisis in Asia was the image of International Monetary Fund managing director Michel Camdessus standing, arms folded, over former Indonesian President Suharto as Mr. Suharto signed a bailout deal with international creditors packed with painful austerity measures and efforts to break up family-controlled monopolies.

For the IMF and many in the West, it was the price a corrupt government needed to pay for funds aimed at keeping a deeply broken financial system afloat and to turn a weakened economy toward sustainable reform. For many in Asia, it was emblematic of the arrogance of the West and its imposition of economic policies that failed in the first place to revive their economies.

Both sides were right, which is why debt crises are best not thought of as black and white morality plays. Each instead represents its own contest of competing interests. How it plays out depends on the broader goals, strategic leverage and degree of desperation experienced by the various players involved.

This reality struck me some months after Indonesia’s January 2008 IMF deal, while based in Hong Kong, when Malaysian officials imposed curbs on foreign divestment. Western bankers in Asia, claiming a higher moral ground, again cried foul and said foreign capital would never return. They were wrong. Capital controls helped to stabilize a worsening financial crisis and the Washington consensus on capital markets suffered a blow.

Who is right in Greece’s standoff today with the IMF and European creditors?

German leaders claim a higher moral ground. When you borrow money you are expected to pay it back. If you can’t you don’t get to borrow again. If you are living above your means you must change your style of living. If you want more money from a lender, you need to behave in ways the lender expects to ensure that money will be returned.

Greece’s leaders feel no less righteous about their position. Why should they suffer when lenders get repaid in full? Didn’t both make a mistake when agreeing to government loans in the first place? Why should Greece accept onerous austerity that hasn’t turned its economy around, and in fact has made it worse in the near-run? Why should Greek workers suffer more than German bankers?

Don’t bother answering these questions. Both sides have a point. What will ultimately dictate the terms of this debt restructuring is the desperation Greeks feel if their banks run dry of euros, competing against the anxiety European leaders feel about the prospect of their single-currency experiment failing. Who is right and who is wrong? They all are. Who wins and who loses? Stay tuned. »

–By Jon Hilsenrath