Selon Forbe’s, la Russie a beaucoup investi afin de parvenir à un acccord le 17 Avril à Doha. La Russie entend montrer qu’elle peut jouer un rôle diplomatique important et servir d’intermédiaire dans les négociations entre l’Iran et l’Arabie Saoudite
http://www.forbes.com/sites/jeremymaxie/2016/04/11/russias-bullish-bet-on-oil-freeze/#31ca20754483
On April 7, the foreign ministers of Russia, Iran and Azerbaijan converged in Baku for what was to be a discussion on bilateral and trilateral energy and infrastructure projects. Instead, the energy agenda was overshadowed by the outbreak of military conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. Although crisis management took priority, the meeting provided Moscow and Tehran with an opportunity to once again discuss their respective positions ahead of the upcoming “production freeze” talks in Doha on April 17. Speaking in Baku, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov confirmed that Iranian and Azerbaijani energy ministers would attend the Doha talks. Lavrov also stated that he expected the Doha talks to yield results
As I previously wrote, Moscow is maneuvering to brokering an “individual solution” for Iran that either grants Iran an exemption or offers Iran a graduated production ceiling that accommodates production increases but requires reciprocal guarantees from Iran that it will smooth oil exports. Lavrov’s comments indicate that the production freeze talks are on track and that Moscow is committed to brokering a deal between Saudi Arabia and Iran. On April 8, Russian Energy Robert Novak reiterated Russia’s expectations that an agreement could be reached at Doha.
Russia’s optimism is matched by Kuwait, whose OPEC governor, Nawal Al-Fuzaia, also expects an initial agreement to be reached at Doha. Meanwhile, Latin American producers Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico and Venezuela met in Quito on April 8 to build consensus ahead of Doha. The regional grouping issued a statement calling on OPEC and non-OPEC suppliers to “take necessary actions to stabilize the market.”
However, it is difficult to reconcile Moscow’s bullish outlook with recent comments by Saudi Arabia’s Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud. In an interview with Bloomberg earlier in the week, the Deputy Crown Prince asserted that Saudi Arabia would not join in the proposed production freeze unless all countries agreed to freeze—including Iran. This blunt message conflicts, if not flatly contradicts, the more ambiguous narrative by Saudi Energy Minister Ali Al-Naimi who has framed the production freeze as “the beginning of a process.”
Moscow appeared caught off guard by Riyadh’s new hardline position. The day after Novak’s meeting with Iranian Petroleum Minister Bijan Zanganeh in Tehran on March 15, it was announced by Qatar (which holds this year’s OPEC rotating presidency) that the oil freeze talks would continue with a date set for April 17, despite Iran’s refusal to cap production until it had reached its pre-sanction production level of 4.0 million barrels per day (mbd). This signaled a breakthrough in negotiations that the Kremlin likely interpreted as attributable to its intercession.
Russia’s Energy Minister has indicated that he would seek to confer separately with Ali Al-Naimi prior to the Doha meeting to get clarification on Saudi Arabia’s position vis-à-vis Iran. Despite the new messaging from Riyadh, Novak remains confident that a consensus can be reached at Doha now that Iran will attend.
Contrary to Saudi Arabia’s seemingly inflexible position, Russia has consistently signaled that there is room for negotiations over Iran when the major suppliers meet in Doha. Novak has stated that although the original production ceiling was to be set at January output levels, alternative proposals to set February or March output levels as benchmarks would be considered if pitched in Doha. Novak’s comments are consistent with that of Kuwait’s OPEC governor who also suggested that February production levels might be considered. Raising the production ceiling is clearly intended to make room for Iranian crude production growth since January.
Recent reports citing Russian Energy ministry sources reveal that discussions have shifted to address how long the production freeze will last and how the agreement will be monitored, not whether there will be a freeze. Key to negotiations will be assumptions about the timing and volume of Iranian oil production and oil exports over the next 6-18 months. One mitigating factor is that despite Tehran’s official goal of adding 1.0 mbd of exports to the market, technical and commercial factors appear to be limiting these projections. Estimates of how much oil Iran can add in 2016 varies from 285,000 barrels per day (b/d) to the 600,000 b/d. Iran has already picked the low-hanging fruit, with February production reaching 3.22 mbd.
brunobertez 