Le nouveau soft power c’est cela c’est celui de la finance, même plus celui de la propagande.

Le gouvernement qui dès sa formation ne l’a pas compris et intégré dans sa stratégie est condamné.

La BCE, les pays européens , les banques, les marchés sont alliés pour mettre les épaules à terre aux gouvernements anti establishment.

La stratégie des élites consiste à  asphyxier le pays recalcitrant , à assécher sa liquidité et sa tresorerie, ensuite à affoler les détenteurs de comptes bancaires pour qu’ils produisent un « run ».  Ensuite, c’est fini, le tour est joué car la masse se retourne contre son gouvernement.

Les anti establishment en Italie n’ont qu’une marge de 6 sièges au sénat; si ils ne ferment pas les frontières monétaires et bancaires, si ils ne controlent pas les mouvements de capitaux, si ils ne lancent pas tout de suite la monnaie parallèle, ils sont cuits.

Dans pareille situation les Italiens n’ont qu’une arme: l’attaque c’est à dire la menace de la bombe atomique: la répudiation unilatérale de leurs dettes.

Toute défense sera au contraire leur perte. Seule l’attaque, pas le bluff, seule l’attaque peut etre efficace.

Comme les Grecs. La Grèce a servi de répétition.

Pour l’instant les leaders anti establishment font fausse route, comme les Grecs en leur temps ils brandissent leur souveraineté! Ils n’ont pas compris que la souveraineté et la légitimité,  les élites euros s’en fichent car elle savent que le soutien populaire est fragile et qu’il ne résistera pas aux difficultés financières, monétaires et bancaires.

Pour tenir face aux élites il faut une monnaie d’échange, il faut qu’elles aient quelque chose à perdre et ce quelque chose à perdre ne peut etre que du domaine financier: la stabilité financiere, la stabilité des banques euros et françaises en particulier et cette  stabilité ne peut être mise en danger que par une répudiation, une fermeture des frontiéres aux mouvements de capitaux.

Il faut comprendre que ce n’est pas une élection, mais une révolution.

On resserre la nasse, on fait exploser les taux du 2 ans, ces taux sont les pivots les plus importants. 

 

 

Les assurances contre le défaut italien eventuel, a suivre, un bon indicateur

 

Suivez l’euro, si il baisse et si les marchés euros se dégradent, cela signifiera que les Italiens ont un rapport de forces qui va dans la bonne direction.

Fitch: New Italian Government Policy Would Increase Fiscal Risks

21 MAY 2018 8:58 AM ET

Fitch Ratings-London-21 May 2018: The coalition policy agreement of Italy’s two most populist and eurosceptic parties increases risks to the country’s sovereign credit profile, notably through fiscal loosening and potential damage to confidence, Fitch Ratings says. How far these risks will translate into weaker credit metrics is uncertain and will depend on the government’s ability to implement its programme and how it resolves trade-offs between different elements.

More than two months after Italy’s inconclusive general election, the anti-establishment Five Star Movement (M5S) and right-wing eurosceptic Lega parties agreed a government programme last week. They will meet with President Sergio Mattarella today to nominate a prime minister. If he accepts their candidate, the president may then formally mandate the two parties to form a government.

Political risk was a key factor in our downgrade of Italy to ‘BBB’/Stable in April 2017, and we noted the growing influence of populism and Euroscepticism « whether exercised from inside or outside government » following this year’s elections when we affirmed the rating on 16 March. The new coalition programme has dropped some proposals from an earlier leaked draft, including creating a mechanism for eurozone countries to leave the single currency. But it confirms the parties’ commitment to measures that imply an expansionary fiscal stance, increases uncertainty about Italy’s banking sector, and makes clashes with eurozone authorities more likely.

Full implementation of the core fiscal commitments, notably universal basic income, dual « flat tax », and changes to the retirement age, would significantly increase the general government deficit from 2.3% of GDP last year. Proposed revenue-boosting measures, for example on tax compliance and amnesties, would not offset these commitments, and the programme is inconsistent with the incoming government’s stated objective of reducing public debt, in our view.

We therefore expect next year’s fiscal deficit to be higher than the 2.0% of GDP we forecast in our March sovereign rating review. Italy’s extremely high public debt, 131.8% of GDP at end-2017, is a key ratings constraint. However, the degree of additional fiscal loosening is uncertain and will become clearer on release of the draft 2019 budget by October.

More broadly, policies may be delayed, watered down or not implemented, depending on various factors. These include the political cohesion of the untested M5S/Lega coalition, appointments to key government positions, the constitutional role of the president and whether he intervenes to support compliance with EU treaties and fiscal rules, and possible market constraints on borrowing to fund spending commitments.

The toning down of anti-euro policies in the final version of the programme, and the legal and political hurdles to leaving the single currency or EU, support our view that a eurozone exit is highly unlikely. However, the presence of such policies in the earlier draft underscores M5S and Lega’s antipathy to the euro, and their willingness to push back against EU fiscal rules.

This stance increases the risk both of a further rise in public debt and of a destabilising reaction by economic actors and in financial markets. Political uncertainty in recent months has not had a major economic impact, with provisional figures showing a 1.4% yoy GDP increase in 1Q18, and the effect on confidence has been mitigated by a reduction in systemic banking sector risks and progress in reducing non-performing loans over the last year. However, programme proposals to make it harder to enforce collateral against borrowers could undermine this progress, damaging banks’ ability to support Italy’s modest economic recovery.

The programme’s intention to « radically revise » bank bail-in rules could be an additional source of tension with the EU and could disrupt Italian banks’ efforts to build up subordinated and non-preferred senior debt buffers to meet regulatory requirements, improve resolvability and strengthen financial stability.

Italy

Eurozone Reforms: A Difficult Path Ahead

Contact:

Douglas Winslow
Director, Sovereigns
+44 20 3530 1721
Fitch Ratings Limited
30 North Colonnade
London
E14 5GN