Les attentes concernant les prochaines discussions entre les États-Unis et l’Iran au Pakistan sont, à juste titre, modestes. Il existe même un risque que la rencontre n’ait pas lieu.

Pourtant, paradoxalement, l’échec des négociations pourrait tout de même faire évoluer la situation dans une direction positive. En effet, le véritable succès du cessez-le-feu ne se mesure peut-être pas à l’obtention d’un accord durable avec l’Iran, mais plutôt à ce qu’il permet d’éviter : même en l’absence d’un accord pérenne, Washington a peut-être trouvé le moyen d’éviter de retomber dans une guerre stérile.

La réaction de Téhéran aux pourparlers a été ambivalente. Le gouvernement a présenté le cessez-le-feu comme une victoire, affichant ainsi sa force tant sur le plan intérieur qu’international. Cependant, de nombreuses voix proches des services de sécurité se montrent moins optimistes, avertissant que l’Iran a peut-être sacrifié son élan et affaibli sa posture de dissuasion en se contentant de moins qu’une cessation complète et immédiate des hostilités.

Néanmoins, quels que soient les débats internes, un point fait peu débat : le cessez-le-feu, en l’état, reflète davantage les conditions de l’Iran que celles des États-Unis.

Examinons ce qu’implique le cessez-le-feu. Les négociations se dérouleront sur la base de la proposition en dix points de Téhéran, et non du plan en quinze points du président américain Donald Trump visant à obtenir la capitulation de l’Iran.

Dans ce cadre, l’Iran conservera le contrôle du détroit d’Ormuz pendant la trêve et continuera de percevoir les droits de transit des navires.

Washington appears to have conceded two critical points: That it tacitly acknowledges Iran’s authority over the strait, and that Tehran holds the upper hand in setting the terms of the talks. Trump himself seemed to signal as much, describing the Iranian proposal on social media as a “workable” foundation.

Unsurprisingly, this has raised eyebrows in Washington, given the scope of Iran’s demands. They range from recognition of Iran’s continued control over the strait and acceptance of uranium enrichment, to the lifting of all US primary and secondary sanctions – as well as United Nations sanctions – to a withdrawal of US combat forces from the region, and a comprehensive ceasefire that would extend to Israel’s operations in Lebanon and Gaza.

It is difficult to imagine Washington agreeing to such terms in full. Just as uncertain is how far Iran is willing to bend – whether it would pare back its demands or hold firm on a maximalist position.

The geopolitical consequences would be profound if the final outcome reflects these demands.

Yet it is equally important to recognise that Tehran is unlikely to wield control of the Strait of Hormuz as a blunt instrument of coercion.

Rather, it is more likely to use that leverage to rebuild economic ties with Asian and European partners – countries that once traded extensively with Iran but were pushed out of its market over the past 15 years by US sanctions. Even so, this would be a bitter pill for Iran’s regional rivals.

Trump, however, has already hinted he may be prepared to accept such an arrangement, noting that the US itself is not dependent on the oil that flows through the strait. The burden, in other words, would fall far more heavily on Asia and Europe.

Tehran’s insistence that the ceasefire extend to Israel may prove the most difficult obstacle, given that the latter is not party to the talks and has long resisted being bound by agreements it did not help shape.

For Iran, this demand is rooted in three considerations. First, solidarity with the peoples of Gaza and Lebanon is not merely rhetorical; it is central to Tehran’s regional posture. Having been widely perceived as abandoning these constituencies in 2024, Iran can ill afford another rupture that would further weaken the so-called “axis of resistance”.

Second, continued Israeli bombardment risks reigniting confrontation between Israel and Iran – a cycle that has already flared twice since October 7, 2023. The linkage between these arenas is not only real but widely acknowledged, including in Western rhetoric that casts Iran as the hub of resistance to Israeli and US policies, expressed through its network of allied groups in Lebanon, Palestine, Iraq and Yemen. From Tehran’s vantage point, a durable halt to its own conflict with Israel cannot be separated from ending Israel’s wars in Gaza and Lebanon. As such, it is not an aspirational add-on but a necessary condition.

Perhaps more consequentially, tying Israel to the ceasefire is a test of Washington’s willingness – and ability – to restrain its closest regional ally. If Trump cannot, or would not, do so, the value of any ceasefire with Washington comes into question. An agreement that leaves Israel free to reignite hostilities – and the US unable to keep itself from being drawn back in – offers little assurance of stability. Under such conditions, the utility of a ceasefire with the Trump administration diminishes sharply.

Whatever the outcome of the talks in Islamabad, the strategic landscape has already been altered. Trump’s failed war has weakened the credibility of US military threats. Washington can still brandish force, but after a costly and futile conflict, such warnings no longer carry the same weight.

A new reality now shapes US-Iran diplomacy: Washington can no longer dictate terms. Any agreement would require genuine compromise – patient, disciplined diplomacy that tolerates ambiguity, qualities rarely associated with Trump. It may also necessitate the involvement of other major powers, particularly China, to help stabilise the process and reduce the risk of a relapse into conflict.

All of this argues for tempered expectations. Yet even if the talks collapse – and even if Israel resumes attacks on Iran – it does not automatically follow that the US would be drawn back into war. There is little reason to believe a second round would end differently, or that it would not again leave Iran positioned to disrupt the global economy. No wonder Tehran feels confident that its deterrence has been restored.

The more plausible outcome is a new, non-negotiated status quo – one not codified through formal agreement but sustained by mutual constraint. The US would stay out of the war; Iran would continue to exert control over traffic through the Strait of Hormuz; Israel and Iran would continue a low-level conflict. A full-scale US-Iran war would be, for the moment, averted.

Such an equilibrium would reflect not enough political will to reach a comprehensive settlement, but sufficient shared interest to avoid a wider conflagration – and a degree of tolerance for an arrangement in which both sides could claim partial victory.

L’Iran pourrait plausiblement affirmer avoir résisté à la puissance combinée d’Israël et des États-Unis tout en conservant, voire en renforçant, sa position géopolitique. Trump, quant à lui, pourrait faire valoir qu’il a évité une nouvelle guerre sans fin, stabilisé les marchés de l’énergie et obtenu des gains tactiques en affaiblissant les capacités militaires iraniennes.

Tant que les deux camps s’accrochent à un récit de victoire, un équilibre fragile – en l’absence d’une guerre à grande échelle – peut encore perdurer.

Les opinions exprimées dans cet article sont celles de l’auteur et ne reflètent pas nécessairement la position éditoriale d’Al Jazeera.

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• Trita ParsiTrita Parsi is the Executive Vice President and co-founder of the Quincy Institute and author of Losing an Enemy – Obama, Iran and the Triumph of Diplomacy