The United States will default on its debt—this is an absolute certainty.

I have been writing this since 2009.

Regardless of the government, the president, or the political party in power, the United States has never sought to make its debt more repayable. Instead, it has pursued only two objectives: first, making the debt more sustainable, and second, finding ways to issue even more of it.

Stephen Miran, a member of the Council of Economic Advisers, has published a white paper on restructuring the global trading system. In it, he outlines “solutions” for restructuring U.S. debt held by foreign entities:

• Converting Treasury securities held by foreigners into 100-year bonds with lower coupons.
• Potentially imposing “user fees.”
• Coordinating a weaker dollar while preserving its status as the global reserve currency.

A former senior adviser to the Treasury, Miran currently advises the U.S. government on economic matters.

Miran is openly stating what many specialists and academics say quietly in private.

This is the American default, reimagined.

The United States carries a public debt burden whose relative weight has long defied the laws of economic gravity. Public debt exceeding 120% of GDP, off-balance-sheet obligations that are not properly accounted for, persistent structural deficits, growing dependence on foreign buyers of Treasury securities, and now reliance on the Federal Reserve and financial engineering maneuvers—all of this points to a trajectory whose fatal outcome

I have predicted for years.

History teaches us that what cannot be honored in full is eventually destroyed, renegotiated, restructured, or partially repudiated.

America will not escape this ancient rule.

Yet a classic default—one involving suspended payments or massive devaluation amid domestic panic—is neither politically viable nor strategically desirable.

It would trigger a deflationary spiral, a collapse in domestic markets, and a sudden loss of confidence in the dollar. In such a scenario, the United States would find itself weakened vis-à-vis China, precisely when systemic rivalry demands a resilient economy and an attractive currency.

It is precisely within this narrow space—between impasse and chaos—that Stephen Miran’s thinking fits. A former senior adviser at the Treasury and member of the Council of Economic Advisers, Miran outlines an alternative path in his white paper A User’s Guide to Restructuring the Global Trading System.

This approach is less spectacular than an outright default but equally transformative: a targeted restructuring of debt held by foreign actors.

His proposals are strikingly clear:

• First, encourage—or compel—official foreign holders to convert their Treasury securities into very long-maturity instruments, including “century bonds” with lower coupons.
• Second, impose “user fees” on interest payments to official foreign holders—a partial withholding of coupons that has all the effects of a tax, without bearing the name.
• Third, coordinate a controlled depreciation of the dollar while maintaining its status as the world’s reserve currency.

This combination is not a mere technical adjustment. It represents a sophisticated form of selective default: American domestic creditors are spared, the internal market is protected, and the burden is shifted onto foreign central banks, sovereign wealth funds, and wealthy foreign stakeholders.China, Japan, Europe, and others would thus see the real value of their reserves eroded—not through outright non-payment, but through forced maturity extensions, reduced yields, and coordinated monetary devaluation.

The cynicism of this approach is overt.

As with everything emanating from the “Trump playbook,” the United States claims to provide the world with a public good—the dollar as reserve currency and, behind it, a security umbrella. This is the classic mafioso argument: the one who threatens you and then offers protection against his own threats.

The dollar is an instrument of seigniorage, a tool for wealth extraction, drainage, and transfer that benefits the United States. It has benefits but also costs. The Trump team seeks to separate the positive from the negative: retaining the advantages while shifting the disadvantages onto others.

The dollar is not a public good; it is a tool of dominance. This is why Miran insists on preserving and even reinforcing its status as the reserve currency.Miran suggests that those who benefit from it should bear a greater share of the costs. The “user fees” and pressure to extend maturities are not arbitrary punishments but are presented as fair compensation for services rendered.

A weaker dollar aims to rebalance trade and revive American industry without sacrificing monetary primacy.In this light, it is easier to understand why so many foreign central banks have accelerated their gold purchases in recent years.

Gold yields nothing, but it depends on no sovereign signature, no political agreement, and no unilateral restructuring decision. It remains the ultimate line of defense against the gradual erosion of dollar reserve value.

This strategy will accelerate distrust among insiders.

The American tactic will be that of the « boiling frog »—proceeding gradually so that the public and vassal or complicit governments do not react.A depreciation that is too abrupt could trigger massive sales of U.S. assets and a sharp rise in domestic interest rates.

Overly aggressive application of fees or forced conversions could accelerate the fragmentation of the international monetary system.

However, this solution offers a decisive advantage over a classic default scenario: it allows the United States to retain the initiative, protect its domestic economy, and transform a structural constraint into geopolitical leverage.

History offers many examples of sovereign debts that were restructured without ever uttering the word “default.”

What Miran proposes is nothing less than a modern version adapted to 21st-century hegemonic power: a default by other, more subtle and selective means.

At bottom, the question is no longer whether the United States will lighten the burden of its debt held by foreign creditors. The question is how they will do so—and whether they can achieve it without losing what still constitutes their strength: relative confidence in their currency and the ability to dictate the terms of the game.

In this regard, Miran’s proposal is neither moral nor immoral. It is simply logical.

Man is a wolf to man; trust is what enables deception.

Accumulating gold during its bearish phases is not merely an investment—it is a political act of self-defense.